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Abstract. Automotive systems become increasingly complex due to their func-
tional range and data exchange with the outside world. Until now, functional 
safety of such safety-critical electrical/electronic systems has been covered suc-
cessfully. However, the data exchange requires interconnection across trusted 
boundaries of the vehicle. This leads to security issues like hacking and mali-
cious attacks against interfaces, which could bring up new types of safety is-
sues. Before mass-production of automotive systems, evidences and arguments 
are required regarding two aspects. Product engineering has been done compli-
ant to specific standards and supports arguments that the system is free of un-
reasonable safety and security risks. 
This paper shows a safety and security co-engineering framework, which covers 
standard compliant process derivation and management, and supports product 
specific safety and security co-analysis. Furthermore, we investigate process- 
and product-related argumentation and apply the approach to an automotive use 
case regarding safety and security. 
Keywords: Safety and security co-engineering • process- and product-based ar-
gumentation • process and argumentation patterns • automotive domain • 
ISO 26262 • SAE J3061 
1 Introduction 
The market and the society are requesting safe vehicles. Upcoming vehicle func-
tions require external sensor data and communication across vehicle boundaries. Fur-
thermore, software updates with new vehicle features can increase road safety, but 
these topics introduce the additional challenge on cybersecurity. Security issues are 
starting to be in the front line in the automotive business because more and more 
problems at the market occurred and have been published by various media. In 2015 
the Jeep Cherokee become unfortunately famous for being hacked remotely [1]. Late-
ly vulnerabilities in Tesla [2] have also become real. In both cases core safety-critical 
elements such as the brakes became vulnerable. The main lessons learned with these 
experiments are that vulnerabilities are hidden in the inner design of the system. Secu-
rity has to be considered at early stages of the concept design [3]. 
The industry and standardization committees are moving forward a collaborative 
approach between safety and security disciplines. Currently, automotive safety and 
security disciplines are not similarly mature - security is less mature than safety [4]: 
While the SAE guidebook regarding automotive cybersecurity is available in the first 
edition, for the established automotive functional safety standard ISO 26262 [5] the 
preparation of edition 2 is ongoing. Both documents note interaction points of func-
tional safety and cybersecurity
1
, but only in an informative way. The standards focus 
on guidance to solve the challenges in the specific safety and security lifecycle. One 
of the challenges identified in the ISO 26262 standard is the need of a safety case 
which provides argumentation in a clear and compressive way that a system achieves 
a reasonable level of functional safety to operate in a given context. While functional 
safety refers to safety against failures in electrical/electronic (E/E) components, in the 
future there has to be argumentation where not only safety but also security and prob-
ably other dependability aspects are covered.  
The paper at hand deals with a concept that covers standard compliant process- and 
product-based argumentation in context of safety and security. Just by following the 
standards procedures, your system is not guaranteed to be free of risks. Standards are 
considered a compilation of best practices which describe industry-wide accepted 
concepts, methods and processes. The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 de-
scribes the state of the art and previous approaches for this problem. Section 3 pre-
sents the safety and security co-engineering framework proposed by the authors. Sec-
tion 4 demonstrates how the approach depicted in  is put into practice by using specif-
ic tools. Section 5 provides conclusions and an outlook on further work. 
2 Background and Related Work 
ISO 26262 is the automotive functional safety standard, describing a safety lifecy-
cle for the development of safety-related automotive systems (targeting passenger 
cars and minivans). The first edition was published in 2011 and is currently in a revi-
sion phase. A new informative annex will define potential interaction and communi-
cation channels between functional safety and cybersecurity. The same concept of 
safety and cybersecurity interaction points is presented in SAE J3061 [6]. The securi-
ty lifecycle specified in SAE J3061 proposes communication paths between safety 
and security engineering. Fig. 1 provides an exemplary overview of the interaction 
between safety and security engineering during the concept phase. The lifecycles 
itself are clearly described in the standards, but the interaction and cooperation is 
currently based on informative annexes which suggest approaches and potential coop-
                                                          
1 The term “safety” refers functional safety according to ISO 26262, and “security” refers to 
cybersecurity according to SAE J3061. 
eration topics. Based on SAE J3061 a joint working group between ISO and SAE was 
started with the goal of developing an SAE/ISO “Standard for Automotive Cyberse-
curity”. For safety and security co-analysis in different lifecycle phases multiple 
methods have been developed, e.g. STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and 
Processes) [7] a theoretic model for safety, SAHARA (Security-Aware HARA) [8], 
an extension of the HARA method (Hazard And Risk Analysis) or FMVEA (Failure 
Modes, Vulnerabilities and Effects Analysis) [9], a combination of threat modeling 
and failure modes and effects analysis. But methods like these need to be embedded 
in a larger lifecycle framework. There is a need to define the open area between the 
standards. 
 
Fig. 1. Comparison of safety- and security engineering 
For safety and security it is required to provide evidence and argumentation to 
show that the system development was done compliant to relevant standards and that 
the system satisfies safety and cybersecurity goals. The final documentation has to be 
provided by the safety case and the cybersecurity case. 
ISO 26262 mentions the possibility to use a graphical notation, Goal Structuring 
Notation (GSN) to create the safety case. GSN’s initial intention was to support safe-
ty case management [10]. Ray and Cleaveland proposed to apply GSN for construct-
ing security assurance cases of medical cyber-physical systems [11]. The graphic 
structure of the security assurance case starts with a top-level security claim node 
accompanied by context information node and then breaks into layers of sub claim 
nodes that argue over different stages and aspects of the development lifecycle. Each 
sub claim is supported by a set of evidence nodes that explain the validity of the 
claim. Basically, GSN for assurance case is a graphic way to organize narrative in-
formation of claim, context, strategy, argument and evidence according to the GSN 
convention. 
Patterns are a suitable way to support argumentation that safety and security relat-
ed requirements are fulfilled. They assist in reusing best practices systematically [16]. 
Menon et al. [12] demonstrate how patterns are used to provide argumentation struc-
tures for software safety arguments. The authors define the structure consisting of 
GSN elements and its applicability. Patterns are usable on all development levels. 
Preschern et al. [13] examine the relationship between security and functional safety. 
The authors present an approach to categorize threats related to the impact to safety-
critical functions. 
3 Safety and Security Co-Engineering Framework 
Fig. 3 shows the main steps of the proposed methodology which considers all process 
steps necessary in an automotive safety and security related development project: 
Regulations and Standards (I) and Process Development (II). In a first step we 
have to identify all relevant regulations and standards. In our automotive use case we 
have to deal with ISO 26262 regarding road vehicles functional safety and 
SAE J3061. It is challenging to match these two topics because they are influencing 
each other. Process developers have to consider that elaborated process steps are not 
only in parallel but also highly interactive, especially when we are focused on func-
tional safety and cybersecurity. In addition, processes have to incorporate special 
analysis methods like STAMP which handles safety and security aspects in one com-
mon analysis methodology. Integrated processes which are basis for co-engineering 
unite safety with security activities. They lead to integrated requirements, work prod-
ucts and argumentation. 
Process Management (III). The core of the framework is the distinction between 
functional safety and security related process and product requirements and the identi-
fication of interactions. Process requirements describe activities and steps which are 
demanded by standards, while product requirements are requirements from the system 
in development. In order to manage the processes and support the processes execu-
tion, appropriate tools are useful, which assist developers with requirement and work 
product management. Work products are process outcomes representing different 
types of evidence. Evidence shows capability and maturity of the development pro-
cess, compliance to the underlying standards and safety as well as security of the de-
veloped products. In addition, evidence is used to support arguments which are relat-
ed to requirements. 
 
Fig. 2. Safety and security co-engineering framework  
Safety and Security Co-Analysis (IV). The intention of the proposed framework 
is to integrate functional safety and security. For that reason we have to deal with 
special analysis methods like STAMP (see section 3.2) which handles safety and se-
curity aspects in one common analysis methodology.  
Process- and Product-based Argumentation (V). Consequently the argumenta-
tion demonstrates that the item under consideration contains no unreasonable risk and 
consolidates functional safety and security. To visualize these relationships between 
requirements and work products we use GSN. A more detailed description of the 
argumentation approach can be found in [16],[17].  
To recapitulate we consider a loop (depicted in Fig. 5) in which every activity is 
supported by a tool. We start with regulations, create processes which are modelled, 
instantiated and executed. The output besides the product is evidence which is used to 
argue that activities for the development of a specific product have been performed 
and are compliant to the regulations. Once an integrated process has been defined 
various disciplines, like safety and security, have to coordinate their actions. In this 
case project managers have exact directives if developers from different disciplines 
resist doing cooperative work. 
3.1 Process Management  
The requirements-driven workflow during process management starts with capturing 
requirements derived from the system artefacts, from standards, and possibly other, 
e.g. domain specific sources. The goal is a valid combined safety and security case, 
which requires evidences for the arguments it is composed of. The next step in the 
process is the definition of the necessary assurance activities, for which appropriate 
tools and methods are assigned. Finally, the assurance activities are processed – as far 
as possible automatically by a workflow engine. Successful assurance activities yield 
the necessary evidences. In case of negative results the faulty system element needs to 
be amended and then the assurance activity needs to be re-processed. When all assur-
ance activities have been processed successfully the combined safety and security 
case is complete and valid. 
 
Fig. 3. Workflow model supporting compositional safety and security case 
3.2 Safety and Security Co-Analysis 
Integrated development processes have to deal with requirements concerning func-
tional safety and security. They affect not only safety related methods (e.g. HARA), 
they also demand methods for joint safety and security analysis (e.g. STAMP, STPA-
Sec, FMVEA). 
STAMP proposes to model systems as hierarchical structures. Higher level control-
lers in the hierarchy control the processes at lower levels via actors, while the lower 
levels send feedback to the higher levels via sensors. It proposes that it is difficult to 
identify root causes for accidents in modern complex system. Therefore, safety acci-
dents should be viewed as a result of a lack of control, instead of a chain or sequence 
of events such as in the Swiss cheese model. Based on the STAMP (Systems-
Theoretic Accident Model and Processes) viewpoint System-theoretic Process Analy-
sis (STPA) is a novel analysis approach based on a control theory based system con-
sideration. System-theoretic Process Analysis for Security (STPA-Sec) [18] extends 
the safety-focused method to cover security. STPA-Sec consists of following steps: 
Step 1. System description (scope, control model, accidents and hazards). 
Step 2. Identification of unsafe control actions (using control actions from Step 1 and 
guidewords to identify unsafe control actions in all system states and environmental 
conditions). Control action not given, given incorrectly, wrong timing or order, 
stopped to soon or applied to long. 
Step3. Identification of scenarios which can cause unsafe control actions: identify, 
based on control loop, scenarios how unsafe control action can be caused. 
Step 4.Design controls and countermeasures based on scenarios. 
 
In STPA-Sec, each control action is analyzed under different possible conditions and 
guide words to identify loss scenarios. A loss is a situation of insufficient or missing 
controls or safety constraints. 
3.3 Patterns for Process and Argumentation 
Patterns are a concept which spreads out in various development areas. We are us-
ing patterns to provide process and argumentation frameworks, which represents most 
of the recurring steps. The intention is to spend time once and reuse the elaborated 
patterns many times. Especially the integration of activities related to functional safe-
ty and security is a challenging work. We have created patterns that provide argumen-
tation- and process- templates. Process patterns simplify creating development pro-
cesses because they already bring together functional safety and security activities. 
Argumentation patterns are corresponding to the process and exhibit the line of ar-
gumentation using the created work products. They include argumentation concerning 
trade-offs between functional safety and security. Both types of patterns have to be 
instantiated for the regarding project. Instantiation for example means to select project 
specific methods like STPA-Sec. In parallel the corresponding line of argumentation 
has to be selected. The purpose of creating patterns within the framework is to simpli-
fy process development and the elaboration of evidence and adequate fitting argu-
ments to support the claims, which are related to requirements. 
4 Application to the Use Case 
The automotive hybrid powertrain board net use-case provides the basis for the 
analysis of safety and security aspects based on state-of-the-art material
2
. An integral 
part of the hybrid powertrain system is the high voltage (HV) battery system, which 
consists of the battery management system (BMS), the battery satellite modules 
(grouping battery cells in modules and communicating via dedicated bus), and a fan 
control for cooling of the battery cells. The BMS is the main E/E system inside of HV 
battery to power electric or hybrid electric vehicles. The BMS consists of several 
input sensors (see Fig. 5) for cell voltages, cell temperatures, output current, output 
voltage, and actuators like HV contactors for disconnection. This system is connected 
to various powertrain control units, the charging interface (enabling the communica-
tion with battery charging stations), the on-board diagnostic interface, and via a dedi-
cated gateway to the vehicle infotainment systems (including the human machine 
interface and a wireless internet connection). 
For the demonstration of the applicability of the co-engineering framework we had 
to use existing tools, which have been extended for specific needs of the presented 
approach: 
EPF-C
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 (Eclipse Process Framework – Composer) is used for tool-support regard-
ing the safety and security process modelling (II). 
WEFACT (Workflow Engine for Analysis, Certification and Test) [15], web-
based distributed platform for requirements-based testing with continuous impact 
assessment in order to support the safety case with evidences. Test workflow was 
extended to a workflow for safety certification and in the EMC² project the attribute 
of security was integrated (III). 
XSTAMPP (eXtensible STAMP Platform) [19] is an Eclipse RCP
4
 based tool 
which guides users through the Safety and Security Co-analysis by STPA-Sec process 
and supports the modelling of control loops and the definition of constraints (VI). 
OpenCert is an open source tool for product and process assurance/certification 
management to support the compliance assessment and certification of safety-critical 
systems in sectors such as aerospace, railway and automotive [14]. OpenCert supports 
creation of GSN structures and mapping of evidence to requirements demanded by 
underlying standards (V). 
In the following, the main parts the framework in scope of the EMC² project will 
be described in more detail. 
                                                          
2 Technology-specific details have been abstracted for commercial sensitivity and presented 
analysis results are not intended to be exhaustive. 
3 Eclipse Process Framework, www.eclipse.org/epf/. 
4 Rich Client Platform 
 Fig. 4. Screenshots showing process modelling and execution (Tools: EPF-C, WEFACT) 
4.1 Process Development and Process Execution 
Efficient safety certification implies a process model which guides the user through 
the certification process and allows efficient compositional re-certification in the 
event of changes in the system. EPF-C provides elements to model phases and indi-
vidual activities of the safety and security process. It allows modelling specific stand-
ards in a formal way, which enables automating the certification workflow.  
WEFACT imports the process model including the activities modeled in EPF-C. 
Fig. 4 shows safety- and security-related parts of the assurance process. The modeled 
assurance activities (small squares in the model diagram) are imported as so-called V-
Plans and displayed as hierarchical list in the project explorer (left part of the GUI 
window). The upper right section of the window shows the assurance (“V&V”) activi-
ties contained in the selected V-Plan. The V-Plan can be associated with the respec-
tive assurance tools (lower right corner). Finally, the assurance activities are pro-
cessed by the workflow engine and deliver evidences for the requirements. During 
workflow execution, the status of the assurance activities changes whenever an activi-
ty is completed; the altered status is indicated by different highlighted colors in the 
list of activities. 
4.2 Safety and Security Co-Analysis using STPA-Sec 
The main accidents related to the BMS are fire/explosion of the battery systems 
and collision with an object: 
 Fire / explosion of the battery system could be caused on the one side by charging 
conditions which are due to manipulation or failures outside of the safe range, but 
also by a modification or error in the operating parameters.  
 Similarly if the operating parameter of the battery system or the control module 
which provides power to the engines are modified or erroneous this could lead to 
undesired acceleration or deceleration which could cause a collision.  
Fig. 5 shows the representation of the system architecture in the used XSTAMPP 
tool for the co-analysis. We focused on the control action “Charging Request” and 
identified the following unsafe control action, based on the guide phrase “Control 
Action given incorrectly”: Excessive charging request is transmitted to charging unit 
during plug-in charging.  
 
Potential safety and security scenarios for such an unsafe control action include: 
 An excessive charging request can be caused by a modified charging request from 
the BMS to the charging unit due to tampered process model in the BMS software 
to enable fast charging for non-fast chargeable batteries. Potential motivation for 
the owner to hack his own car is that he is interested in faster charging and does 
not care about longevity of battery due to leasing contract for battery. 
 A wrong charging request from BMS to charging unit may be caused by a fail-
ure/design error in the temperature sensor for a battery. Due to financial reasons a 
malicious manufacturer could reduce the number of sensors per battery cells below 
the number required for a reliable reading. One additional scenario is that a 
maintenance provider uses sensors with lower resolution and hacks the control sys-
tem to accept these sensors which may be not certified for the task. 
 Even when the vehicle BMS requests the correct power level a malicious manipu-
lation on the communication between BMS and charging unit could lead to an un-
safe charging request. Such a manipulation could be directed at the charging unit or 
the central charging management system at the backend. 
 
Fig. 5. Part of control loop of the battery management system (Tool: XSTAMPP) [20]  
We use the tool XSTAMPP to identify potential safety-related accidents, based on 
potential causes from safety and security, e.g. failures and malicious manipulations by 
an attacker. In independent analysis the focus of security would be on the classical 
CIA properties (confidentiality, integrity and availability). The feedback of safety 
relevance of certain properties is missing. Safety specific analysis focuses only on 
safety issues caused by faults of E/E systems. Scenarios in which a user modifies the 
vehicle and causes a potential safety hazard would be missed. 
Co-Analysis connects the domains and supports the identification of safety goals 
and safety-related security goals. 
4.3 Process- and Product- based Argumentation 
Application of the methodology during the development of a BMS of a connected 
electrified hybrid powertrain starts with selection of underlying standards. In this use 
case we consider ISO 26262 and SAE J3061 which are modeled in EPF-Composer as 
standard compliant integrated process model. The intention is to consider interacting 
functional safety and security activities. Based on the process model we examine the 
concept phase which includes the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA). 
Results of the HARA are “Automotive Safety Integrity Levels” (ASIL), safety goals 
to mitigate potential safety-critical hazards and high level safety requirements. If se-
curity should be considered as well the necessary process steps based on SAE J3061 
have to be added to the existing process model. In other words, the existing template 
based on ISO 26262 has to be extended with steps related to a co-engineering process. 
Executing this process means to perform co-analysis using STPA-Sec method. One 
result of the co-analysis is the hazard "overcharging battery during plug-in charging" 
for which developers have to implement an adequate countermeasure. Overcharging 
will be possible if an attacker modifies the BMU parameters. To document the rela-
tionship between requirements (represented as goals) and measures (declared in evi-
dence documents) we use the OpenCert GSN editor. On the one hand the argumenta-
tion covers the safety and security process and on the other hand it deals with the 
product specific decision how to prevent "battery overcharge". From the security pro-
cess point of view the top level claim is "define functional cybersecurity requirements 
to prevent unauthorized changes to BMU parameters". These requirements are listed 
in the corresponding project specific document "HV_Batt_SecReq" stored in the pro-
ject repository. From the product side of view the BMU needs capabilities to detect 
and prevent unauthorized change of parameters. The documentation of these capabili-
ties is evidence and usable as product-based argumentation. 
4.4 Results of investigation 
The presented co-engineering framework was demonstrated by application to a hy-
brid electric vehicle powertrain use case. The application of the methodology shows 
that the way how functional safety and security should correspond, has not been de-
fined clearly up to now. The usage of patterns speeded up the process development 
activities and supported creation of argumentation fragments by GSN. GSN structures 
connect processes and evidence with argumentation. The graphical depiction of links 
between these elements improves the stakeholder’s understanding. The tool OpenCert 
provides the possibility to manage patterns and create GSN structures. In particular, 
this type of representation is an easy way to make clear how the dependencies be-
tween safety and security are organized. The execution of the assurance activities by 
the workflow engine WEFACT allowed widely automated generation of evidences 
for the combined safety and security case. The co-analysis method STPA-Sec was 
supported by the tool XSTAMPP. 
5 Conclusion  
Today’s interconnected world needs special care to consider safety and security 
aspects. Although there are approaches treating the interaction between safety and 
security adequately they are still immature. This paper presented a safety and security 
co-engineering framework. A comprehensive combined safety and security argumen-
tation methodology for the automotive domain has been developed. Its application in 
the automotive domain within the standards constraints provides useful information 
and can be considered as the next step for a wide application in development lifecy-
cles. The following important benefits of the presented methodology for argumenta-
tion apply to the automotive domain: Usage of patterns speeds up the development 
e.g. process activities; the GSN structures connect process- and product-related evi-
dence with argumentation; the graphical depiction of links between these elements 
improves the stakeholder’s understanding of relevant safety and security aspects. In 
the HEV powertrain use case we showed the benefit of combined analysis of safety 
and security issues and the preparation of a security-aware safety case. GSN is an 
easy way to make clear how dependencies between safety and security are organized 
and why the selected trade-off is suitable. 
The question, what is a compelling argument regarding a trade-off between func-
tional safety and security which is able to pass the final assessment, has not been an-
swered in a satisfactory manner and needs further investigation. The idea of safety 
and security co-engineering is becoming an accepted approach and it is required to 
appear in a specific standard regarding safety and security co-engineering activities 
and shall be treated in a normative manner. Experience gained in projects like EMC² 
will try to reach standardization committees and influence developments of future 
editions of standards with the goal of supporting assurance case establishment. 
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